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Frequentist Inference 
basis the data can then be used to select d so as to 
obtain a desirable balance between these two aspects. 
Criteria for selecting d (and making analogous choices 
within a family of proposed models in other problems) 
have been developed by Akaike, Mallows, Schwarz, 
and others (for more details, see, for example, Linhart 
and Zucchini 1986): 
Bayesian solutions to this problem differ in a 
number of ways, reflecting whether we assume that the 
true model belongs to the hypothesized class of models 
(e.g., is really a polynomial) or can merely be approxi-
mated arbitrarily closely by such models. For more on 
this topic see Shao (1997). 
See also: Estimation: Point and Interval; Robustness 
in Statistics. 
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Frequentist Interpretation of Probability 
If the outcome of an event is observed in a large 
number of independent repetitions of the event under 
roughly the same conditions, then it is a fact of the real 
world that the frequency of the outcome stabilizes as 
the number of repetitions increases. If another long 
sequence of such events is observed, the frequency of 
the outcome will typically be approximately the same 
as it was in the first sequence. 
Unfortunately, the real world is not very tidy. For 
this reason it was necessary in the above statement to 
insert several weasel words. The use of 'roughly the 
same,' 'typically,' 'approximately,' and 'long sequence' 
make it clear that the stability phenomenon being 
described cannot be stated very precisely. A much 
clearer statement is possible within a mathematical 
model of this phenomenon. This discovery is due to 
Jacob Bernoulli who raised the following question. 
It is well known, Bernoulli says in Part IV of his 
book Ars Conjectandi (published posthumously in 
1713), that the degree to which the frequency of an 
observed event varies about the probability of the 
event decreases as the number of events increases. He 
goes on to say that an important question that has 
never been asked before concerns the behavior of this 
variability as the number n of events increases indefi-
nitely. He envisages two possibilities. 
(a) As n gets larger and larger, the variability 
eventually shrinks to zero, so that for sufficiently large 
n the frequency will essentially pinpoint the probability 
p of the outcome. 
(b) Alternatively, it is conceivable that there is a 
positive lower bound below which the vari ability can 
never fall so that p will always be surrounded by a 
cloud of uncertainty, no matter how large a number of 
events we observe. 
Bernoulli then proceeds to prove the law of large 
numbers, which shows that it is (a) rather than (b) that 
pertains. More precisely, he proves that for any a> 0 
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where X j n is the frequency under consideration. 
It is easy to be misled into the belief that this 
theorem proves something about the behavior of 
frequencies in the real world. It does not. The result is 
only concerned with properties of the mathematical 
model. What it does show is that the behavior of 
frequencies in the model is mirrored in a way that is 
much neater and more precise, the very imprecise 
stability phenomenon stated in the first paragraph of 
this article. 
In fact, a result for the model much more precise 
than (I) was obtained by De Moivre (1733). It gives 
the normal approximation 
Pr ( 1~-p ~ < cjVn) -> J'1,~tp(x) dx (2) 
- Cj \ Jl (j 
where tp denotes the standard normal density. This is 
again a theorem in the model. The approximate 
corresponding real-world phenomenon can be seen, 
for example, by observing a quincunx, a mechanical 
device using balls falling through 'random' paths to 
generate a histogram. 
De Moivre's result was given a far reaching generali-
zation by Laplace (181 0) in the central limit theorem 
(CL T) concerning the behavior of the average X of n 
identically, independently distributed random variable 
Xw .. , X ,. with mean,; and finite variance a'. It shows 
that 
Pr ( IX - ,;1 < cj Vn) -> r :.tp(x) dx. (3) 
This reduces to (2) when X takes on the values of I and 
0 with probabilities p and q, respectively. The CLT 
formed the basis of most frequentist inference 
throughout the nineteenth century. 
The first systematic discussion of the frequentist 
approach was given by Venn (1866), and an axiomati-
zation based on frequencies in infinite random se-
quences (Kollectives) was attempted by von Mises 
(1928). Because of technical difficulties his concept of 
a random sequence was modified by Solomonoff 
(1964), Martin-Lof (1966), and Kolmogorov (1968), 
with the introduction of computational complexity. 
(An entirely different axiomatization based on events 
and their probabilities rather than random sequences 
was put forward by Kolmogorov in 1933, and has 
successfully served as a basis for both frequentist and 
subjective interpretations of probability). For more 
details on these different approaches see Barnett 
(1982) 
The frequentist concept of probability described so 
far has met considerable criticism. One of the main 
objections is that it is not applicable to many situations 
to which one might want to apply probability assess-
ments. To see this, consider the following three 
possibilities. 
Frequentist Interpretation of Probability 
(a) An actual sequence of repetitions may be 
available; for example, a sequence of coin tosses or a 
sequence of independent measurements of the same 
quantity. 
(b) A sequence of repetitions may be available in 
principle but not likely to be carried out in practice; for 
example, the polio experiment of 1954 involving a 
sample of over a million children. 
(c) A unique event which by its very nature can 
never be replicated, such as the outcome of a particular 
historical event; for example, whether a particular 
president will survive an impeachment trial. The 
conditions of this experiment cannot be duplicated. 
The frequentist concept of probability can be 
applied in cases (a) and (b) but not in the third 
situation. An alternative approach to probability 
which is applicable in all cases is the notion of 
probability as degree of belief; i.e., of a state of mind 
(for a discussion of this approach, see Robert (1994)). 
The inference methods based on these two interpreta-
tions of the meaning of probability are called fre-
quentist and Bayesian, respectively. 
Although frequentist probability is considered ob-
jective, it has the following subjective feature. Its 
impact on a particular person will differ from one 
person to another. One patient facing a surgical 
procedure with a I percent mortality rate will consider 
this a dire prospect and emphasize the possibility of a 
fatal outcome. Another will shrug it off as so rare as 
not to be worth worrying about. 
There exists a class of situations in which both 
approaches will lead to the same probability assess-
ment. Suppose there is complete symmetry between 
the various outcomes; for example, in random sam-
pling which is performed so that the drawing favors no 
sample over another. Then we expect the frequencies 
of the various outcomes to be roughly the same and 
will also, in our beliefs, assign the same probability to 
each of them. 
Let us now turn to a second criticism of frequentist 
probability. This concerns the difficulty of specifying 
what is meant by a repetition in the first sentence of 
this section. Consider once more the surgical pro-
cedure with I percent fatalities. This figure may 
represent the experience of thousands of cases, with 
the operation performed by different surgeons in 
different hospitals and- of course- on different pat-
ients. The rate of fatalities may vary from one hospital 
or surgeon to another and may, in particular, vary 
drastically with the condition, for example, the age 
and general health, of the patient. 
Suppose a young woman requires this operation 
although her general health is very good. The fre-
quency of a fatal outcome with patients sharing these 
characteristics may be much lower, and the I percent 
figure in that sense would be quite misleading for her. 
And yet she might be considered to have been obtained 
under 'roughly the same conditions,' namely to be 
drawn at random from the total population of persons 
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requiring this surgery. To obtain the most useful 
figures one should identify the most important vari-
ables, classify the cases accordingly (for example, 
young, middle-aged, old; male, female; etc.) and then 
provide the frequency for each class. They will, of 
course, be meaningful only for the classes which 
contain a reasonable number of cases. 
I. A Terminology Note 
A source of much confusion in the discussion of 
probability is the fact that 'probability' is used both as 
a mathematical term, i.e., as a concept in the math-
ematical model and also in everyday language when 
talking about real events. When reading about prob-
ability, it is important to be aware of these two 
meanings and to keep them distinct. 
See also: Frequentist Inference; Probability: Formal; 
Probability: Interpretations; Statistical Methods, 
History of: Post-1900; Statistical Methods, History of: 
Pre-1900 
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Freud, Sigmund (1856-1939) 
I. Family Background and Early Life 
Sigmund Freud, neuroscientist turned founder of 
psychoanalysis, was born on May 6, 1856, in Freiberg, 
Moravia, now part of the Czech Republic. His father , 
Jakob (1815- 96), a wool merchant, came from Galicia, 
and married Amalie (1835- 1930, nee Nathansohn), 20 
years younger, when he was 40. Jakob had two sons by 
a previous marriage, Emanuel and Philipp. Jakob was 
warm and affectionate, with a strong sense of humor, 
and Freud evidently admired and respected him. 
Amalie was a lively and attractive woman who was 
proud of Sigmund, her first-born. 
The family multiplied quickly: five daughters and 
two more sons were born within 10 years. The first of 
these, Julius, died when 8 months old and Sigmund 
was aged 19 months. Both parents were Jews, with no 
religious affiliations, though a devout Catholic Nanny 
took Sigmund to Church. She left when he was two 
and a half. A nephew, John, a year older than Freud 
was very close to him: the two fought and played 
together. That childhood ambivalence, Freud reflected 
years later, must have had a profound effect on his 
character and on his ability to defend himself (Freud 
1900). 
Financially, times were hard. In 1859 the family 
moved to Leipzig, and in the following year to Vienna. 
Freud missed the beauty of the countryside round 
Freiberg. Although the children were well looked 
after, poverty was not assuaged by rapid family 
growth. By 1875 family fortunes improved: Amelie's 
family were helping, making possible a move to a 
larger house. Freud had a room of his own that served 
as a study. 
Freud's memories of his childhood as revealed in his 
writings are without early detail, but one unforgettable 
recollection was of urinating in his parents' bedroom 
while they were present. Reprimanding him, his father 
said bluntly: 'The boy will come to nothing!' Freud's 
wounded ambitions were reflected recurrently in 
dreams in which he listed his achievements as if to say: 
'You see! I have come to something!' (Freud 1900; see 
also Shengold 1993). 
2. Education and Early Interests 
Freud's schooling began with his mother, until his 
father took over before sending him to a private 
school. Freud learned rapidly, and was reading 
Shakespeare (whom he loved all his life) from the age 
of eight years. When nine years of age, he won a place 
at the Sperl Gymnasium, where he was a distinguished 
pupil, passing out, at 17, with the distinction 'summa 
cum laude.' He became an accomplished linguist, with 
a firm foundation in Latin and Greek, a sound 
knowledge of Hebrew, fluency in English and French, 
and good Italian. He corresponded with an adolescent 
friend in Spanish. He became one of the greatest 
stylists in the German language (Kaufmann 1980). He 
studied at every opportunity. He loved the Arts, but 
took an early dislike to music, which he never felt able 
to appreciate. He was fond of walking, swimming, and 
skating. He liked travel, and made his first visit to 
England at the age of 19. 
